USA v. Michael Lowry by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-10-2012 
USA v. Michael Lowry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Michael Lowry" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1019. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1019 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2503 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL LOWRY, 
           Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Criminal No. 10-cr-00238-001 
(Honorable Alan N. Bloch) 
______________ 
 
Argued April 17, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  May 10, 2012) 
 
RENEE PIETROPAOLO, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
1500 Liberty Center 
1001 Liberty Avenue 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 
 Attorney for Appellant 
 
LAURA S. IRWIN, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
REBECCA R. HAYWOOD, ESQUIRE 
Office of the United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street, Suite 4000 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 
 Attorneys for Appellee 
 
2 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Michael Lowry pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).  He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, which he 
appeals.  We will vacate and remand for resentencing.  
I. 
 After an attempted drug sale to a police informant, Lowry was indicted for 
possession with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).  He pleaded guilty to the offense. 
 The Presentence Investigation Report determined that, based on an offense level of 
15 with six criminal history points, the range of imprisonment under the sentencing 
guidelines was 24 to 30 months.  Absent any objections, the District Court adopted the 
report as accurate.  The government filed a sentencing memorandum requesting an 
upward variance to 72 months because Lowry’s criminal history category did not include 
three convictions for juvenile drug trafficking or adequately consider Lowry’s continued 
recidivism.  The memorandum also alleged that Lowry had committed an uncharged 
murder.  Lowry responded by noting that the previous convictions were for small-time 
dealing and possession, and submitted that, if the court wished to consider these 
convictions, it could raise Lowry’s criminal history category to the next category rather 
than doubling the recommended maximum sentence.  Lowry also disputed the 
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government’s assertion that he had committed a murder and argued any consideration of 
this factor in sentencing would violate his constitutional rights. 
 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court stated that it would not consider the 
allegations of Lowry’s involvement in a murder in sentencing.  It then sentenced Lowry 
to 120 months’ imprisonment.  In making this determination, the Court reasoned that the 
Guidelines’ recommended range was insufficient because it failed to account for Lowry’s 
three juvenile adjudications.  It also noted that Lowry had served most of a three- to six-
year state sentence for a similar crime, and concluded that, “[i]f a six-year sentence did so 
little to deter the Defendant’s criminal activities, a guidelines sentence in the range of 24 
to 30 months would have little or no impact.”  The Court determined that “a guideline 
sentence would not adequately protect the public from the Defendant, provide any hope 
for rehabilitation, or provide adequate deterrence,” and that a “a sentence substantially 
higher is needed in this case.” 
 Lowry timely appealed.1
II. 
 
We review sentencing decisions in two stages.  First, we determine whether the 
sentencing court committed “significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, 
failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”  United States v. Gall, 552 
U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  If we determine the district court committed procedural error, we 
remand for re-sentencing.  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010).  
But if the decision is procedurally reasonable, we proceed to review for substantive 
reasonableness, affirming “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
The Supreme Court has made it “pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-
discretion standard of review . . . applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions.” 
Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.  We do not presume a sentence outside the Guidelines range 
unreasonable, although a “major departure should be supported by a more significant 
justification than a minor one.”  Id. at 50.  The ultimate “[t]ouchstone of ‘reasonableness’ 
is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 
(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  In making this determination, we give “due deference” to the 
district court’s determination that “the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of 
the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  The mere “fact that the appellate court might 
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to 
justify reversal of the district court.”  Id. 
Here, the sentence imposed by the District Court constituted a substantial upward 
variance: it was 400% greater than the maximum that the District Court properly 
calculated under the Guidelines and nearly double the sentence sought by the 
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government.  Nonetheless, a substantial variance may be procedurally reasonable as long 
as it is “accompanied by a thorough justification of the sentence, ‘including an 
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines.’”  United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 
434, 446 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). 
The District Court recognized that it was imposing a sentence “substantially 
higher” than that recommended under the Guidelines, and justified its decision by 
reference to several of the § 3553(a) factors.  Nevertheless, despite this thoughtful 
analysis, the proffered explanation is insufficient to support the sentence, which we 
conclude was procedurally unreasonable. 
Most significantly, the District Court did not consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), 
which requires courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”  
Although we fault defendant’s counsel for not raising the issue of disparity more clearly 
(particularly in response to the government’s request for a sentence more than twice the 
Guidelines’ recommended maximum), we believe that, under the totality of the 
circumstances and in view of the advisability to provide a substantial explanation for a 
substantial variance,2
                                              
2 The issue of disparity was implicated by the defendant’s urging that he receive a 
sentence within the guidelines, as well as his proposal to revise his criminal history 
category to the next category, Category IV, rather than the substantial increase the 
government sought. 
 the issue was adequately raised to warrant consideration.  The 
District Court was not obligated to explicitly discuss this question as long as “the record 
makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.”  United States v. 
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Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).  But here, where there is no suggestion in the 
record that the District Court considered sentencing disparities, we cannot determine that 
this standard was satisfied.  See Merced, 603 F.3d at 224.  We accordingly conclude that 
the sentence was procedurally unreasonable and will remand for resentencing.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Lowry’s sentence and remand for 
resentencing.  
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USA v. Michael Lowry, No. 11-2503  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority that Michael Lowry’s sentence should be vacated and 
remanded to the District Court for resentencing.  I, however, would do so for a different 
reason because in my view, counsel at sentencing rendered Lowry ineffective assistance 
by failing to properly object to the severity of his sentence. 
 
The majority believes that counsel adequately raised the sentencing disparity, 
obligating the District Court to address it.  I do not.  I agree that, where the district court 
substantially varies from the Guidelines, it must provide a substantial explanation for 
doing so.  Nonetheless, it is counsel’s responsibility to identify deficiencies in the district 
court’s reasoning so that—in addition to preserving the issue for appeal—the court has an 
opportunity to augment its explanation or, perhaps, alter its decision.  It is asking too 
much of the District Court that it divine from vague references to the Guidelines that 
counsel believes that the sentence is unreasonably disparate from others similarly 
situated.   
 
In my view, the glaring deficiency was with counsel’s failure to raise the 
sentencing disparity at the sentencing hearing.  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
are generally not reached on direct appeal except, in those rare circumstances, where “the 
record sufficiently establishes a basis for our review.”  United States v. Theodoreopoulos, 
866 F. 2d 587, 598 (3rd Cir. 1989) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Price, 
76 F.3d 526, 528 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 
125, 133 (3d Cir. 1984).  This case fits within that narrow exception because there is no 
need for further factual development here.  It was incumbent upon counsel, knowing that 
the Government was going to ask for a sentence in excess of 72 months, to come armed, 
not only with an objection to the disparity of the sentence, but with exemplar evidence 
sufficient to convince the District Court that the sentence is unreasonably disparate from 
others similarly situated.  I would remand on this basis.  
 
 
